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Stick a Fork in It: Is Juvenile Justice Done?
INTRODUCTION
After more than a century, the juvenile justice system is in
danger of becoming obsolete. The line between adult and minor is
becoming more and more indistinct as the modem perception of the
accountability of juveniles increases,1 and the much-debated nature of
the juvenile justice system has left it in a twilight zone between
punishment and rehabilitation.2 All of these factors have prompted
some to suggest that perhaps the juvenile justice system has outlived
its usefulness, that its processes are duplicative, that it is a mere
superfluity. Others have suggested that the juvenile justice system is
merely in need of refinement. The system therefore stands at the
edge, ready either to metamorphosize into another incarnation or
plunge headlong into the abyss. This Note will examine the
likelihood of each outcome - arguing that the existing juvenile
justice system should be bifurcated to take into consideration the very
real differences between children and adolescents, much in the same
way that the original intent of the juvenile justice system was to
consider the differences between adults and juveniles.
Part I outlines the nature and the history of the juvenile justice
system, particularly the changing methodology and objectives of the
contemporary system. Part I also illustrates the opposing theories
which construe the juvenile justice system. First, the juvenile justice
system is often seen, and traditionally was intended, as a civil
remedy. 3 This civil remedy theory concentrates on the offender as a
person in need of direction and care.4 As a civil remedy, many of the
rights that are protected by the Constitution in criminal cases are
1 See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the
Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083 (1991)
(detailing the changing perceptions of youth and how the twentieth century has a "vastly
different conception of childhood from the one that gave birth to the juvenile court").
2 See Kelly Keimig Elsea, The Juvenile Crime Debate: Rehabilitation,
Punishment, or Prevention, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135 (1995) (analyzing the much
debated nature of the juvenile justice system in relation to the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994).
3 See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
4 See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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inapplicable. 5 Conversely, the juvenile justice system is increasingly
considered a punitive criminal remedy.6  This second theory
concentrates on the offense as a crime for which adequate punishment
is due. 7 When juvenile justice is viewed as a criminal remedy instead
of a civil remedy, many of the civil rights normally available to the
juvenile may be limited.8 By limiting the rights of juveniles under
both civil and criminal methodologies simultaneously however, the
juvenile justice system functions to give juveniles "the worst of both
worlds." 9
Part II elucidates aspects of the juvenile justice system which
have been interpreted and may still be interpreted as violative of the
Constitution. It addresses the importance of the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of assistance of counsel,10 and further explores the double-
standard under which juveniles may be deemed competent to waive
their right to counsel, yet allowed to disaffirm a contract for counsel. 11
Part II also addresses the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment - specifically the various institutional
conditions that function to deny rights to both juvenile offenders and
the so-called "status" offenders that are often incarcerated with
them. 12  Part II further discusses the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition on involuntary servitude and the paradox of allowing
5 See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
6 See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
7 See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
8 See infra note 13.
9 United States v. Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (illustrating how the
juvenile justice system affords children "neither the protections accorded to adults not the
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children").
1o See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
11 See Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to
the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 163, 172 (1993) (noting that "minors
are less likely to invoke their rights and more likely to waive them" than are adults
accused of the same crimes). Since "approximately 90% of [adult criminal] defendants
plead guilty", minors are more likely to suffer injustice through the imprudent waver of
counsel. Idat 172-73.
12 See Jan C. Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, Incarcerating Status
Offenders: Attempts to Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act,
16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 41, at 58 (1981) (finding that, though the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act explicitly forbids incarceration of status offenders with
offenders, a number of states have been able to circumvent such prohibitions).
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compulsory labor as a "punishment for a crime" in an ostensibly
"non-criminal" proceeding.13  Additionally, Part II discusses the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of Due Process, evaluating how
the juvenile justice system determines whether to retain jurisdiction
over a juvenile or send that juvenile on to adult criminal
proceedings.
14
Part III outlines some of the remedial measures that have been
implemented to cure the juvenile justice system of its ailments, such
as the Judicial Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA") of
1974; the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
("VCCLEA") of 1994; the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA")
of 1995; and the Omnibus Crime Control Act ("OCCA") of 1997.
Part IV proposes a number of remedies and evaluates the
constitutionality of each. One of the proposed changes is a complete
abolition of the juvenile justice system and a return to the pre-juvenile
justice system regime, under which age was merely a mitigating factor
in the sentencing process.' 5 This proposal will be evaluated under the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of Equal Protection of the Laws,
to determine whether juveniles receive the full protection of the laws
in adult criminal courts, or whether the adult criminal system creates a
stigmatizing effect which precludes the use of age as a mitigating
factor. 16  Another proposal would maintain the existing juvenile
justice system, but legislatively amending it in order to remedy its
shortcomings.' 7  The third proposal, and the one advocated by this
note, is to create an additional juvenile justice system, which
distinguishes children from adolescents, and adolescents from adults.
This proposal expressly acknowledges the differences between the
individuals within the juvenile justice system. Only this way, by
treating children, adolescents, and adults according to their
physiological and psychological differences, can the original
13 Donald C. Hancock, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Juvenile Justice
System, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 614, at 616 (1992) (outlining the arguments
against imposing compulsory labor demands on juvenile detainees where the juvenile is
not entitled to those processes that ensure Due Process to criminal defendants).
14 See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
15 See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
16 See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
17 See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
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objectives of the juvenile justice system be fulfilled.
I. BACKGROUND OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
The juvenile justice system in America was established with
the creation of the first juvenile court by the State of Illinois in 1899.18
Prior to the creation of this court juveniles were tried as adults in a
criminal court where, under the common law defense of infancy, the
age of the offender was only a mitigating factor in the sentencing of a
juvenile. 19 Illinois' motivation for creating the juvenile court was the
thought that juveniles were not getting adequate attention in the turn-
of-the-century adult criminal courts. 20 As this century begins to turn
anew and the juvenile justice system nears its centennial, its
objectives and effects are coming under greater scrutiny.2' The
juvenile justice system is threatened with extinction from both ends of
the ideological spectrum.22 It is less and less the rehabilitative
program it was intended to be, 23 and has increasingly become the
adversarial and punitive process it was meant to leave behind.24
18 See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2 (West 1998) (amending 1899 I11. Laws
131, §§ 1, 21).
19 See Robert W. Sweet, Deinstitutionalization of Status offenders: In
Perspective, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 389, 390 n.5 (1991) (noting that under the commonlaw
defense of infancy, children under the age of seven could not be held culpable for their
actions, children between the ages of seven and fourteen had a rebuttable presumption of
innocence, and children above the age of fourteen were charged as adults).
20 See Charles J. Aron & Michele S.C. Hurley, Juvenile Justice at the
Crossroads, 22 JUNE CHAMPION 10, 12 (1998) (noting that, among other things, "juries
were often hesitant to convict juveniles because they feared the negative effect such
sentencing and incarceration would have once the juvenile offenders were returned to
society.").
21 See Mark Soler, Juvenile Justice in the Next Century: Programs or
Politics?, 10-WTR CRIM. JUST. 27, 28 (1996).
22 See id.
23 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 20, at 10 (noting the shifting emphasis
from "protecting and reforming children to "protecting' society from young people
prematurely deemed incapable of rehabilitation").
24 See Susan K. Knipps, What is a "Fair" Response to Juvenile Crime?, 20
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 455, at 456 (1993) (noting that the juvenile justice system "has
practically gone full circle in one hundred years: from prosecution of juveniles in the
adult courts, to adjudication in a separate non-criminal system, and then back to
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The traditional rationale for rendering juveniles wards of the
state was the doctrine of parens patriae, literally "parents of the
country." 25 In addition to the custodial powers that it may exercise
over property, the doctrine ofparens patriae allows the government to
become the custodian of a child, and to assume the child-rearing
duties normally assumed by the child's parents. 26 By acting as the de
jure parents of a juvenile, the government becomes entitled to the
same discretion exercised by the natural parents, specifically those
activities relating to raising and disciplining the child.27  This
patriarchal view of the juvenile justice system has, in turn, supported
the notion that the system is a non-adversarial one - a system where
the normal protections of the adversarial criminal system are
unnecessary. 28  However, as the system tends to become more
punitive than rehabilitative, this non-adversarial fagade serves to
disenfranchise many of the individuals that are subject to the juvenile
justice system.
A. Classification of Juveniles Subject to the Juvenile Justice System
It is often overlooked that the scope of individuals subject to
the juvenile justice system is not limited to offenders; i.e., those
juveniles that have committed or have been accused of committing a
crime. 29  Both non-offenders and so-called "status" offenders fall
prosecution of some juveniles in the adult system").
25 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1991) (defining parens patriae as
"a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign interests such as health,
comfort and welfare of the people, interstate water rights, general economy of the state,
etc.").
26 See Kristina H. Chung, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating
Juveniles in Adult Jails, 66 IND. L. J. 999, 1008-09 (1991) (noting that the doctrine of
parens patriae in the juvenile justice system was generally understood to grant the state
the power "to assume responsibility over neglected and abandoned children").
27 See Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to
Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. Rv. 927, at 927 (1995) (noting that the
early advocates of the juvenile justice system "claimed that.. .the juvenile justice system
would be able to rehabilitate young lawbreakers and derail their incipient criminal
careers").
28 See id.
29 See Chung, supra note 26, at 1005.
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under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system.30  One of the
principal problems with the system is that its classifications make too
little distinction among the individuals it exercises control over.
Presently no consideration is given to any psychological or
developmental differences between juveniles of different ages, rather
they are only classified by what means they have come into the
system.
1. Non-Offenders
Non-offenders are those individuals who have come into the
juvenile justice system through the independent actions of third
parties, usually parents or guardians. 31 These cases often include
juveniles that have been neglected or abused.32 This group is the
traditional rationale for parens patriae jurisdiction in that they come
to be in the custody of the state because of the way that they have
been treated.33 However as the system moves increasingly toward a
punitive nature, this rationale for jurisdiction over this group is
gradually compromised.
2. "Status" Offenders
The second group of juveniles subject to the jurisdiction of the
juvenile justice system are the status offenders. 34 Status offenders are
those juveniles who have committed an act of noncriminal
misbehavior, "which is considered unacceptable solely because of
their age." 35 The activities in which status offenders have engaged
would not subject them to punishment if an adult committed the same
acts. 36 Status offenders are those juveniles who have been deemed
delinquent based on a nebulous pronunciation of their status as
30 See id.
31 See Costello & Worthington, supra note 12, at 42.
32 See id.
33 See supra note 26.
34 See Costello & Worthington, supra note 12, at 42 (defining and illustrating
the current usage of the term "status offender").
31 See id.
36 See id.
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"incorrigible," "wayward," or "habitually disobedient., 37  These
vague characterizations open the door for a tremendous amount of
judicial discretion.38 The brief moments status offenders spend before
the judge seem particularly inadequate for determining whether a
child is in actuality "incorrigible."
3. Offenders
Offenders are those juveniles who have committed some
criminal act; unlike status offenders, they have committed acts that
would result in criminal prosecution if committed by an adult. This
group of juveniles often raises fewer concerns regarding their
treatment because they are considered as culpable as their adult
counterparts. However, even among this group, little distinction is
made for psychological and physiological differences, particularly
between relatively young and relatively older offenders. The result is
that a very young offender and a relatively older offender may be
housed together. This situation may ultimately jeopardize the well
being of the younger offender in the same way that the well being of a
juvenile is jeopardized when housed with adults.3 9
4. Classification Problems
One of the difficulties associated with the present
classification regime is that it treats many juveniles as fungible. For
instance, it is possible that a non-offender victim of sexual abuse
could, by attempting to run away from a state facility, be labeled as a
status offender. This unfortunate result is only exacerbated by cases
such as Marterella v. Kelly,40 which chronicled numerous abuses of
the juvenile justice system, yet still held that status offenders could
37 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 9 n.6 (1967) (citing the Arizona Juvenile Code
provision under which Gerald Gault had been adjudicated "delinquent").
38 See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
39 See Jeffery Fagan, Juvenile Justice Policy and Law: Applying Recent
Social Science Findings to Policy and Legislative Advocacy, 183 PLI/CRM 395, 398
(1999) (noting that "adolescents sentenced and incarcerated as adults are more likely to be
physically and sexually assaulted").
40 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), supplemented by 359 F. Supp. 478
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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legally be housed alongside offenders. 41  Now labeled a status
offender, the victim of sexual abuse could ultimately be legally placed
in the same cell as a juvenile sex offender.42
The case of status offenders particularly is complicated by the
vagueness of phrases such as "wayward," "truant," or "incorrigible,"
which suggest that status offenders may have been deprived of
procedural due process. If concrete definitions cannot be formulated,
juveniles may have no notice as to what acts could subject them to
punishment as status offenders. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
ruled that punishment based on status is unconstitutional.43 It is hard
to reconcile that holding with the anomalous result that a status
offender (who has not committed any criminal act) can be
incarcerated, while an adult who commits the same act can not.44
Another problem with classification solely on the basis of
actions is that it ignores physical and developmental differences
between juveniles of different ages. As such the juvenile justice
system itself ignores the differences between older and younger
juveniles in the same way that the preceding system ignored the
differences between adults and juveniles.
B. The Objectives of Juvenile Justice
Historically, the aim of the juvenile justice system, as an entity
separate from the adult criminal system, has been purportedly
rehabilitative; 45 the doctrine of parens patriae, the basis of the
juvenile justice system, calls for intervention on behalf of juveniles
before they become hardened, recidivist, adult criminals. 46  The
system is designed, ostensibly, to provide a civil remedy: there are no
41 See id. at 575 (holding that it is not unconstitutional to mix status offenders
and delinquents in the same facilities).
42 See Chung, supra note 26, at 1000 (illustrating how, through sequential
adjudications, "a victim of parental neglect was as likely to be transferred [to a maximum
security building] as a convicted delinquent").
43 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 442 U.S. 563 (1975) (ruling that a
nondangerous person cannot be confined because of their status as mentally ill).
44 See id.
45 See infra note 97.
46 See supra note 27.
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convictions, and findings of guilt are termed "adjudications." 47 There
is no "sentencing," but a "disposition." 48 The non-criminal nature of
juvenile proceedings, along with the doctrine of parens patriae, has
been cited to justify why many of the constitutional rights that are
extended to adults in criminal prosecutions have been denied to
juveniles who commit similar offenses. 49  The rationale is that
juveniles are not actually being deprived of life, liberty, or property,
but are merely being placed in the custody of a more fit guardian -
the state.5 °
This tautology has allowed a number of state governments to
circumvent the traditional constitutional protections to which adults
are entitled - such as bail, trial by a fair and impartial jury, notice of
the charges of which one is accused, the assistance of counsel,
freedom from involuntary servitude, the equal protection of the law,
and procedural due process. 51  Though there has been a gradual
affirmation that such juveniles are entitled to some of the protections
afforded under the Constitution,52  the disparity between the
rehabilitative and the punitive nature of the juvenile justice system has
allowed some courts to find that many of the constitutional protections
that adults take for granted are inapplicable to juveniles.53 Again, the
47 See Honorable Ronald D. Spon, Juvenile Justice: A Work "In Progress ",
10 REGENT U. L. REV. 29, n.13 (1998). "The term 'disposition' is customarily used in
juvenile court parlance in place of the word 'sentencing,' as delinquency cases are
generally technically deemed as 'civil' in nature, as opposed to 'criminal'." This is true
even though 'delinquency' by definition, necessarily involves a violation of a criminal
statute, law or ordinance." Id.
4" See id.
49 See Ainsworth, supra note 27, at 935 (illustrating how the "juvenile court
shrugged off due process concerns as irrelevant to the primary mission of the court, which
was.. .the crafting of dispositions to address the social needs of the offending youth").
50 See id.
51 See infra notes'58-1 11 and accompanying text.
52 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (affirming the Constitutional right of
juveniles to notice, assistance of counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 565 (1966) (requiring a hearing before a juvenile could be waived into adult criminal
court, where a "full investigation" of every element of the crime was statutorily required);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that due processes required proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (prohibiting transferring
a juvenile to an adult criminal court after a adjudicatory hearing on the same charge).
53 See generally McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971)
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rationale is that, under a custodial system, there is no need of
constitutional protections, since the government is protecting the
juvenile; therefore such constitutional protections would be
duplicative. 54 This is tantamount to a claim that there is no need of
any constitutionally protected freedoms, since the government will
protect those freedoms that are deemed important by the government.
Such a position is not only untenable, but it is arguably the precise
threat of governmental intrusion that the Constitution protects against:
the determination and limitation of rights under the implausible guise
of "protection."
Though the historical characterization of the juvenile justice
system was rehabilitative, increasingly the trend is to characterize the
juvenile justice system as punitive.55 This trend offers support to the
modern notion that the juvenile justice system is a superfluity: if the
adult penal system works equally well for both adults and children
(and the juvenile justice system is merely duplicative of the work
done by the adult criminal system), then the juvenile justice system is
unnecessary. This reasoning is flawed because it assumes that the
adult criminal procedure will adequately protect the juveniles who
come under its jurisdiction.56 The adult criminal process is replete
with occasions where a juvenile is treated less fairly than an adult in
the same situation.57
(denying juveniles the right to a jury trial in adjudicatory hearings); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985) (holding that neither a warrant nor probable cause was required
in cases of searches of students by school officials if the searches are "reasonable").
54 See Ainsworth supra note 27.
55 See Elsea, supra note 2, at 136 (illustrating that, regardless of the original
intention of the juvenile justice system,"[s]ociety is beginning to view children as less
innocent and more capable of distinguishing right from wrong").
56 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 20, at 10 (indicating that the trend is from
rehabilitation to punishment and "protecting society from young people prematurely
deemed incapable of rehabilitation").
57 See Elsea, supra note 2, at 142 (showing that an average juvenile's stay in
detention is ten months longer than adults, that "adults are often released before serving
their maximum time [whereas] juveniles are not" and that they serve "50% longer
sentences for the same homicide convictions as their adult counterparts").
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Sixth Amendment and the Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the criminal defendant the
right to counsel and the right to a jury trial.58 The juvenile justice
system, however, has been allowed to do away with these rights.59
First, the juvenile justice system precludes trial by jury.6" The
reasoning for this denial has been similar to the reasoning that
precludes the right to a jury in civil cases:61 because juvenile
proceedings are not "criminal," they are not protected under the Sixth
Amendment, which only guarantees the right to a jury trial "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions. 62 Many of the protections that are mandatory
in the adult criminal system are considered unnecessary in the juvenile
justice system, because it is argued that, as in civil proceedings, less is
at stake in juvenile proceedings than in criminal proceedings.63 The
history of courts being more protective of criminal proceedings -
which generally implicate the loss of life and liberty - and being less
protective of civil proceedings - which generally only implicate the
loss of property - is undeniable.64 By reasoning that juveniles are
not actually being deprived of life and liberty as the basis for denying
58 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury... to be informed of
the nature and the cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense." Id.
59 See supra notes 46-50.
60 See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 (pointing out that "[d]espite all these
disappointments, all these failures, and all these shortcomings, we conclude that trial by
jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement").
61 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (illustrating the general
principle that the courts will be more solicitous of those proceedings which threaten life
and liberty than property).
62 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (ensuring that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...").
63 Cf Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1971) (acknowledging the inherent
seriousness involved in juvenile and subsequent criminal proceedings which might
subject a juvenile to double jeopardy).
64 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151 (outlining the "history of trial by jury in
criminal cases").
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them the protections of the criminal system, the juvenile justice
system further ignores the fact that many juveniles stand to lose as
much in the way of liberty as an adult who is convicted in the adult
system.
65
Second, the juvenile justice system allows juveniles to waive
their right to counsel - a right that was protected under In re Gault.
66
The result is that a juvenile, in exercising this right, may actually
appear before a judge without the benefit of counsel.67  Most
jurisdictions will uphold the waiver of counsel if the waiver was
"knowing and voluntary", whereas only a very few states presume
that the juvenile is incapable of waiving this right.68 This right to
waive counsel is especially paradoxical where it is widely
acknowledged that proceeding pro se is unwise, even for experienced
69litigators, much less for inexperienced juveniles.
It is also paradoxical that, although juveniles are presumed to
not be competent to enter into contracts, they are presumed competent
to waive their right to counsel.70  They cannot drink, nor vote, nor
even drive, but they have the "right" to dispense with some of their
most precious constitutional protections, protections that they likely
know little or nothing about. 71 Under common law, minors were able
to disaffirm contracts they entered into. 72 Once a right to counsel has
65 See Ainsworth, supra note 27, at 944 (noting that "sentences of juvenile
confinement frequently exceed the sentences meted out in municipal court").
66 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (affirming the applicability of a number of rights
guaranteed to criminal defendants to juvenile court proceedings).
67 See Robert E. Shepard, Jr., Juveniles' Waiver of the Right to Counsel, 13-
SPG CRIM. JUST. 38, at 39 (detailing the various approaches that law has taken to juvenile
waiver of counsel).
68 See id.
69 See People v. Riccardi, 50 Cal. App. 427, 451 (1920) (holding that it is not
prejudicial misconduct for the judge to state that "a lawyer who acts as his own attorney
has a fool for a client").
70 See CBS, Inc. v. Tucker, 412 F. Supp 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (affirming the
right of a minor to disaffirm contracts entered into as a minor). Common law long
presumed that minors were not competent to enter into contracts. Id.
71 See Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to
the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 163, at 172 (1993) (noting that
"minors are less likely to invoke their rights and more likely to waive them [than
adults]").
72 See Dominic J Ricotta, Eighth Amendment - The Death Penalty for
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been waived however, any earlier constitutional violations are no
longer considered reversible error.73 If the common law is any guide,
a juvenile should be able to disaffirm a waiver of counsel.74 This
would, of course, likely give rise to a number of occasions where the
right to counsel had been waived, and then such waiver disaffirmed.75
In order to prevent repetition of adjudicative proceedings, it is more
logical to deny juveniles the "right" to waive counsel.76
Characterizing the ability to nullify one's own constitutional
protections as a "right" belies the older myopia that the juvenile
justice system is a nonadversarial system, and that a juvenile does not
need counsel because the judge is his counsel.77  Given the
practicalities of the juvenile justice system, this position is almost
laughable: presently, even those public defenders that are not
imprudently waived away by the juvenile spend only minimal time
with each client. 78 It is unreasonable to expect that a judge, whose
"sensibilities are blunted from the hundreds, if not thousands, of cases
that she hears every year," will be able to effectively counsel each
child, much less have each child's individual interests in mind.79
B. Eighth Amendment and Cruel & Unusual Punishment
A variety of conditions inherent in the juvenile justice system
have been held cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment.80 The often endemic brutality and physical
Juveniles: A State's Right or a Child's Injustice?, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 921, at
n.29 (1988) (limiting those contracts that can be disaffirmed to exclude contracts for
"necessities").
73 See id. at 172 (citing the "series of Supreme Court decisions establish[ing]
that if a defendant pleads guilty, almost all antecedent constitutional violations are
waived").
74 See id.
75 See Ainsworth, supra note 1, at 1126 (citing "recent empirical studies
revealing that a shockingly high proportion of juveniles still are tried without lawyers").
76 See id. at 173.
77 See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
78 See Soler, supra note 21, at 30 (noting the "crushing caseloads" and lack of
training and resources ofjuvenile defenders).
79 See Ainsworth, supra note 27, at 942.
80 Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D.Tex. 1974), rev'd, 535 F.2d 864
(5th Cir. 1976); rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977) (finding numerous violations of the
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abuse of juveniles committed by an institution's staff, and also by
other juveniles with the tacit approval by the staff, has been ruled
cruel and unusual punishment.81 This is particularly problematic
where some of the juveniles potentially subject to such conditions are
merely status offenders who have been incarcerated with juvenile
offenders. 82 Additionally, insufficient staffing of facilities has been
considered cruel and unusual punishment in situations where it serves
to deny juveniles medical and psychiatric care.83 Overcrowding,
though it has not yet been ruled cruel and unusual per se, can similarly
curtail the ability of the juvenile justice system to adequately provide
for a juvenile - therefore overcrowding can deny a juvenile requisite
care.
84
C. Thirteenth Amendment and Involuntary Servitude
The Thirteenth Amendment, enacted after the Civil War, is
largely accepted to be applicable in the context of slavery in which it
was written. 85 However, it may also be implicated when juveniles are
forced into compulsory labor.86 One of the arguments in favor of the
constitutionality of compulsory labor, such as work detail, is that it
serves a rehabilitative purpose.87 Under this reasoning, compulsory
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment present in several juvenile institutions).
81 See id. at 73 (illustrating some of the "various forms of physical abuse,
applied by the staff or other boys with the encouragement of the staff," to which juveniles
held in protective custody might be subjected).
82 See id. (showing that some of the juveniles in the juvenile institutions, and
therefore potentially subject to cruel and unusual punishment "consisted of such 'status'
offenses as truancy, incorrigibility, or running away from home").
83 See id. at 105 (finding that juveniles are entitled to medical and psychiatric
care that meets "minimally acceptable professional standards").
84 See Soler, supra note 21, at 28 (explaining how "overcrowding has a
serious impact on the security in the institutions, the provision of health and mental health
care and other basic services, the availability of education and other programming, the
level of institutional conflict and violence, and the danger of suicides").
85 See Hancock, supra note 13, at 615 (noting that it also limits compelled
labor as a punishment for a crime).
86 See id. (noting that a number of states "subject delinquents to compulsory
labor expressly for the purpose of punishment, not rehabilitation" in violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment's requirement of Due Process).
87 See id. at 628.
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labor has been found to be constitutional, but only where it can be
shown that the required work is indeed rehabilitative. 88 "Educational"
or "vocational" programs must also be shown to actually be
rehabilitative in order to qualify as an exception to the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude.89
A number of institutions have classified labor performed by
the juveniles as "voluntary." 90 This "voluntary" labor was coerced by
threatening the imposition of some other form of punishment in lieu
of the voluntary labor, and is considered violative of the Thirteenth
Amendment. 91  Several forms of coercion, such as the threat of
solitary confinement for failure to comply with some compelled labor,
have been held to be unconstitutional.
92
Proponents of compelled labor often argue that it is part of the
punishment of adjudicated juveniles that they perform such labor, and
that the state is exempt from the Thirteenth Amendment's strictures
when it is acting in a parens patriae capacity. 93 This rationale fails
first because the Thirteenth Amendment allows involuntary servitude
only "as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted., 94 However, it is well established that the juvenile
justice system is not criminal in nature, and that such juveniles have
not been convicted of any "crime." 95 Worse still, this parens patriae
reasoning is undercut "[a]s juvenile justice adopts the punitive nature
of the criminal justice system . . . the government may act less as a
surrogate parent and more as an adversary.'
96
Similarly, because the juvenile justice system is a distinct
88 See id. at 636.
'9 See id.
90 See Hancock, supra note 13, at 626.
91 See id. at 614 (arguing that imposed involuntary servitude is violative of
the Thirteenth Amendment because the juvenile justice system is neither "criminal" nor
subject to the due processes of the criminal court).
92 See Morales v. Turman, 430 U.S. 322 (1977) (limiting compulsory labor at
juvenile detention centers).
93 See Hancock, supra note 13, at 618 (noting that "[alt common law, courts
have exempted parents - and anyone acting as parents - from the prohibition of
involuntary servitude as it applies to children in their custody").
94 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
95 See Rosenberg, supra note 73.
96 Hancock, supra note 13, at 618.
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entity apart from the adult criminal system, it is professedly
rehabilitative and not punitive.97 How then can the imposition of
involuntary servitude on juveniles properly be termed a "punishment"
under the Thirteenth Amendment?98
Furthermore, the Thirteenth Amendment further requires that
the punishment be for a crime for which one had been "duly
convicted". However, because waiver into the adult criminal system
often procedurally denies the juvenile the right to an individual
hearing, there may be insufficient due process to qualify any
punishment as an exception to the Thirteenth Amendment, even when
the juvenile has been duly convicted as an adult.
99
Additionally, considering that a number of status offenders
would be subject to the same treatment as adjudicated offenders in the
name of "discipline,"' 00 the argument that compulsory labor is a
punishment for a crime, and therefore comes under the exception to
the Thirteenth Amendment, is untenable.' 0
D. Fourteenth Amendment and Due Process
The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
implicated at every stage in the juvenile justice system. The right to
procedural due process is implicated in the denial of the right to a jury
trial; the denial of bail where there had been no finding of a "serious
risk" that the juvenile would commit a crime before trial;10 2 the waiver
of the right to counsel by a juvenile (who would be considered
incompetent to make such a determination in other circumstances);'
0 3
and the waiver into the adult criminal system by the prosecutor or
legislature. 1 04 Such waivers by the prosecutor ("prosecutorial
97 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 20, at 12 (stating that the juvenile justice
system "inaugurated the goal of rehabilitating and reintegrating juvenile offenders into
mainstream society").
98 See id at 631 (noting that juveniles are not convicted of committing
crimes, but are determined to be delinquent for some offense).
99 See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
100 See Hancock, supra note 13, at 643.
101 See id.
102 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, at 278 (1984).
103 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
104 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 20, at 63 (outlining the procedural
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waivers") amount to a violation of due process because they vest in
the prosecutor the ability to file "concurrent jurisdiction" in both adult
criminal and juvenile courts, 10 5 and allow the prosecutor total
discretion to decide in which court to proceed. 10 6 This vests in the
juvenile's adversary the power to treat the juvenile as an adult,
without giving the juvenile the opportunity to demonstrate
otherwise. 10 7 In a similar manner, legislative waivers are thought to
violate procedural due process because, by mandating which offenses
must be tried in adult criminal court, waivers effected by legislature
do not provide for individual hearings to determine whether the
juvenile should be tried as an adult.108 Some scholars suggest that the
best alternative between the two has been the judicial waiver
advocated in United States v. Kent,10 9 even though Kent struck down a
judicial waiver on the basis that the juvenile did not have a hearing,
that the juvenile had been denied the assistance of counsel, and that
the judge had not provided any basis for his decision. 0 Pointing out
that both prosecutorial and legislative waivers deny juveniles counsel
and individual hearings, Kent suggests that the only acceptable waiver
of a juvenile into the adult criminal court would be by way of a
judicial waiver after a hearing that has sufficient procedural
safeguards.' 11
III. ATTEMPTED REMEDIES
Based on the legislation of the past few decades, federal
intervention and preemption of state law appears to be the best
method of implementing a uniform juvenile justice system.
1 12





109 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
.10 See id. at 546.
111 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 20, at 62 (noting that "[t]he main
difference [that distinguishes judicial waiver] is that it is approached and utilized on a
case-by-case basis").
112 See infra notes120-149 and accompanying text.
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However, because federal preemption of state laws is limited to the
financial incentive authorized to Congress by the Spending Power, the
usefulness of such legislation is limited.113 The influence of the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA") of 1974
has been limited to withholding federal funds from states that do not
meet its guidelines."14  The Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act ("VCCLEA") of 1994 served primarily to facilitate
the prosecution of juveniles in adult criminal proceedings.' 1 5  By
allowing easier transfer into the adult criminal system, the VCCLEA
potentially violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of Due
Process. 116 The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") of 1995
limits the right of all prisoners, juveniles and adults alike, to effect
change in their environment."17 Though not specifically directed at
juveniles, the PLRA significantly decreases the likelihood that injuries
done to juveniles will be adequately redressed. 18 Similarly, by
automatically waiving juveniles into the adult criminal system for
certain types of crimes, the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1997 is
potentially violative of due process in that it does not provide hearings
to investigate the specific circumstances of individual juveniles before
transferring them to adult criminal court."19
A. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
In 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA). 12 ° The JJDPA limits what the
113 See Costello & Worthington, supra note 12, at 58 (noting how "[m]any
states have ingeniously taken advantage of the loopholes left by the language of both the
[Juvenile Justice and Delinquency] Act and the [Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention]").114 See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
115 See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
116 See generally supra note 108 and accompanying text.
117 See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
118 See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
119 See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
120 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5601-
5777 (1974) [hereinafter, JJDPA]. The JJDPA is limited in that it can only enforce its
provisions to the extent that the States are unwilling to forego federal funding; if a state
were to decide that its juvenile justice system did not need federal funding, the provisions
of the JJDPA would be unenforceable. See Chung, supra note 26, at 1015.
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states can do in their sovereign territories by making federal funding
dependent on compliance - a regulatory scheme implicitly
authorized to Congress via the spending power.' 21 However, because
the JJDPA only preempts state sovereignty to the extent that the states
require federal funding, noncompliance with the terms of the JJDPA
will only result in the forfeiture of federal funds.122 Furthermore the
JJDPA allows a number of exceptions for minor, de minimus
noncompliance.' 23  Moreover, the JJDPA also allows a three-year
grace period in which to remedy even serious violations.' 24 Although
the JJDPA has had some effect on the amount of non-offenders that
are presently being housed with offenders,1 25 the JJDPA still allows
the unacceptable mixing of offenders and non-offenders where such
mixing is considered "minor" or where a state decides that federal
funding is unnecessary.126 Thus, the relatively loose strictures of the
JJDPA allow constitutional violations to continue for long periods of
time.
121
B. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
With the increasing perception that juveniles and adults were
being inadequately punished for the commission of violent crimes,
Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
("VCCLEA"). 128 Two provisions specifically provided for legislative
121 See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
122 See Chung, supra note 26, at 1017 (explaining how a "state that fails to
adhere to the Act's requirements may lose its federal funding unless the state can commit
to achieving full compliance within a three-year period").
123 See Sweet, supra note 19, at 408 (noting that such violations will be
determined de minimus on a case-by-case basis).
124 See Chung, supra note 26, at 1015.
125 See Michael J. Dale, Lawsuits and Public Policy: The Role of Litigation in
Correction Conditions in Juvenile Detention Centers, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 675, 702 n.150
(1998) (noting that the numbers of status offenders and non-offenders that are being
housed in secure facilities has dropped in recent years).
126 See Soler, supra note 21, at 29 (indicating that "several jurisdictions are
considering noncompliance with the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act, thus forfeiting significant federal funds, in order to make widespread use of adult
jails to incarcerate children and to engage in other actions the Act would not permit").
127 See Chung supra note 26.
128 See Soler, supra note 21, at 28 (noting that "[t]he public feels ever more
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waiver of juveniles into the adult criminal system: Title XIV "Youth
Violence"'1 29 and Title XV "Criminal Street Gangs."' 3 °  Title XIV
"Youth Violence" operates to transfer juveniles to the adult criminal
system because of the violence of the offense. '31 Juveniles accused of
violent offenses such as murder, robbery, and rape could be waived
into adult criminal proceedings.' 32 Title XV "Criminal Street Gangs"
similarly transfers juveniles involved in criminal street gangs to adult
criminal proceedings - depending on their role in the gang. 133 A
leadership role or other influence over other persons would "weigh in
favor of a waiver of a transfer to adult status".' 34 Under both of these
provisions waiver is not automatic. 135 A court must apply a number of
balancing factors, including: "the age and social background of the
juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the
juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual
development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment
efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; [and] the
availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral
problems". 36 Though these guidelines only list what factors shall be
weighed and not how to weigh those factors, they are superior to both
a strict legislative or prosecutorial waiver - neither of which has any
guidelines. 1
37
threatened by juvenile crime, despite the fact that most types of juvenile crime are at or
below levels of 20 years ago").
129 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994).
30 18 U.S.C. § 521 (1994).
131 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (prosecution as adults of certain juveniles for crimes of
violence).
132 42 U.S.C. § 3751(b)(23) (1994) (bindover system for certain violent
juveniles).
133 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (adult prosecution of serious juvenile offenders).
134 See id.
135 See Charles J. Aron & Michele S.C. Hurley, Juvenile Justice at the
Crossroads, 22-JUNE CHAMPION 10, 62 (1998) (detailing the processes required in order
to effect a transfer of a juvenile to the adult criminal court under Titles XIV and XV of
the VCCLEA).
136 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West 1998). "Evidence of the following factors shall
be considered ... in assessing whether a transfer [to an adult criminal court] would be in
the interest ofjustice." Id.
137 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 20, at 62 (noting that judicial waiver "will
provide for a less arbitrary, non-partisan, non-adversarial balancing of mutual interests of
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C. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
Following much public denouncement of "frivolous prisoner
litigation," Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA")138 which restricted the rights of prisoners to bring suit
against the institutions that detain them. 139 This limitation - though
not specifically targeted toward juveniles - was later extended to
include juveniles in Alexander v. Boyd,140 which held that the plain
meaning of the statute's language was meant to include juvenile
detention centers.1'4  The PLRA also limits the right to attorney's
fees: it places upon prisoners or juveniles the burden to prove
eligibility for attorneys fees; that said fees were incurred in proving an
actual violation of the prisoners rights; and that the fees were
proportional to the ordered relief.142 By placing the burden of proof
on the litigant in these situations, the PLRA attempted to cure the
juvenile justice system of some of its failings.1 43 Paradoxically, by
greatly circumscribing the methods which prisoners and juveniles can
protect their rights, and reducing the avenues for genuinely aggrieved
juveniles to pursue reform, it also silences many legitimate complaints
that would serve to better the juvenile justice system.
144
D. Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1997
The Omnibus Crime Control Act ("OCCA") was an attempt to
"reform juvenile law so that the paramount concerns of the juvenile
justice system are providing for the safety of the public and holding
juvenile wrongdoers accountable for their actions."' 145  Section 1112
of Title 18 amends the provisions set out in the Violent Crime Control
the juvenile offender and society."
' 18 U.S.C. §3626 (1996).
139 See Dale, supra note 125, at 704.
140 113 F. 3d 1373 (4th Cir. 1997), cert denied 522 U.S. 1090 (1998).
141 See Dale, supra note 125, at 705.
142 See id. at 706.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1997, Title XI-Violent and Repeat
offenders, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., 185 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1997)).
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and Law Enforcement Act ("VCCLEA") of 1994 in Section 5032146
by allowing for the prosecutorial discretion of whether to bring
criminal charges against a juvenile 14 years of age or older. 147 This
"prosecutorial waiver" is problematic for the reasons mentioned
earlier, in that it vests in the prosecutor (the archetypal adversary of
the juvenile and adult alike) the same power formerly reserved for the
juvenile judges, who are - ostensibly, at least - impartial. 48 Lack
of adequate statutory guidance similar to the language of the
VCCLEA, and the lack of the opportunity for the juvenile to have a
hearing on his or her particular case prior to being sent to adult
criminal court, are among the major flaws with this attempt to revamp
the juvenile justice system. 1
49
IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES
A. Abolition of the Juvenile Justice System
A number of legal theorists, noting the demise of both the
juvenile justice system and the culture that created it, have suggested
the abolition of the juvenile justice system altogether.' 50  This is the
position taken by a number of liberal thinkers, who maintain that the
current juvenile justice system serves only to deprive juveniles of their
146 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 20, at 63 (criticizing the Omnibus Crime
Control Act's prosecutorial waiver as "[t]he most controversial of the three transfer
mechanisms").
141 See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1997).
148 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 20, at 63 (illustrating how "the
prosecutorial waiver mechanism ... fails to protect the best interest of juveniles, when
prosecutors are not required to consider those interests" and can avoid the burden of
proving that the juvenile offender should be tried as an adult).
"' See id.
15o See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 691, at 725 (1991) (stating that "rejecting the juvenile court's premise that young
people are inherently irresponsible can begin a process to reexamining childhood that
extends to every institution that touches their lives"). Feld suggests that by treating
juvenile offenders as their adult counterparts, the constitutional violations of the juvenile
justice system can be remedied. See id. at 720.
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constitutional rights.' 51  These scholars suggest that, because the
juvenile justice system tends to treat the juveniles as second-class
citizens anyway, the offending juveniles are taking opportunities away
from non-offenders and status offenders. 152  According to these
scholars, it is wiser to get rid of the juvenile justice system
completely, and remand criminals to the criminal courts, regardless of
age.153  The argument is that the youth of the offender will either
excuse his wrongdoing or act as a mitigating factor in the sentencing
phase. 154 Our legal system might then return nostalgically to the days
before the creation of the juvenile justice system. 155 This idealism
ignores the fact that it is not at all conclusive that age will be a
mitigating factor, since it seems that the creation of the juvenile
justice system a century ago was spurred by the feeling that,
regardless of theoretical reasoning, age was not being considered as a
mitigating factor in criminal proceedings in practice.' 
56
Surprisingly, many of the country's conservative thinkers are
also of the opinion that the juvenile justice system should be
abandoned. 57  Conservatives suggest that the role of any criminal
process is retributive or punitive, and that because rehabilitative
efforts in the juvenile justice system have failed, the juvenile justice
system is particularly ineffective. 158  By considering the juvenile
51 See id.
152 See Ainsworth, supra note 27, at 927 (noting that "[t]he unhappy truth is
that we as a society do not particularly value young people").
153 See id. at 930 (arguing that her real object is "the abolition of 'adult court',
with all the assumptions entailed by its necessary contrast with juvenile court").
154 See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, at 116 (1997)
(advocating a "youth discount" that reduces the maximum penalty by a certain percentage
per year younger than eighteen).
155 See Feld, supra note 150, at 724 (reminiscing that "[y]outhfulness ... has
long been recognized as a mitigating, even if not an excusing, condition at sentencing").
156 See Ainsworth, supra note 27, at 947 (pointing out that "[o]nce waived
into the criminal courts, the juvenile is transformed into an "adult," with all that the
designation entails").
157 See Spon, supra note 47, at 34 (concluding that "the administration of
'true' justice requires that laws and court decisions be in accord with God's nature and
character, as revealed in the created order and in the holy scriptures").
158 See Alfred S. Regnery, Getting Away with Murder: Why the Juvenile
Justice System Needs an Overhaul, POL'Y REv., Fall 1985, at 65.
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justice system as a failed punitive process, conservatives join liberals
in the proposal to do away with the present juvenile justice system. 159
This strange consensus - that the juvenile justice system
should be eradicated - would be the legislative equivalent of a
judicial concurrence in judgement: the ends are agreed upon, but the
reasoning is vastly different. Conservatives hope that the abolition of
the juvenile justice system will better punish those people that are
deserving of punishment, whereas liberals hope to put an end to the
undeserved punishments that result from the unconstitutional practices
of the present juvenile justice system.' 60  The resulting concurrence
appears to be that somehow the eradication of the juvenile justice
system will simultaneously punish more and punish less.
One of the many problems with this conclusion is the
likelihood that the abolition of the juvenile justice system will serve
only to punish more. Contrary to the suggestions of juvenile court
abolitionist Professor Barry Feld, who maintains that "providing an
explicit 'youth discount' to reduce adult sentences can ensure an
intermediate level of just punishment,"' 161 it seems likely that many
officials will probably treat every criminal alike, regardless of age.
The danger lies in the sentiment that, once the juvenile has been
treated as an adult, any leniency based on the notion that the juvenile
is not an adult will be incongruous - many opponents of juvenile
court abolition point out that the treatment of a juvenile as a juvenile,
after having been nominally designated an adult, is unlikely. 62 Even
an explicit "youth discount" like the one proposed by Professor
Feld 163 is likely to be ineffective where the parameters of such a
discount can fluctuate within sentencing guidelines; after all it is hard
to reconcile giving any offender a "discount", as if they were getting
159 See Soler, supra note 21, at 27 (illustrating how "[p]ublic officials point to
isolated crimes as justification for broad-scale 'get tough' attitudes").
160 See Sweet, supra note 19, at 397 (illustrating "legal moralists" and
"constitutionalists" from Anthony Platt's book The Child Savers: The Invention of
Delinquency).
161 Feld, supra note 150, at 724.
162 See Rosenberg, supra 11, at 175 (asserting that "[b]ringing children within
the criminal jurisdiction is an assertion by the state that minors do not receive specialized
treatment") (emphasis added).
163 See Feld, supra note 154.
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their sentence on sale from K-Mart. It remains unclear whether
"youthfulness" will be wholly within the discretion of the judge or on
some form of sliding scale - some ratio of gravity of the offense
compared to the age of the perpetrator.' 64  Both methods seem
impracticable. Leaving the "discount" to the discretion of the judge,
even if she is bound by balancing factors, 165 would still leave her a
tremendous amount of latitude in sentencing. On the other hand, a.
predetermined sliding scale that discounts the maximum sentence per
year younger than eighteen presents the problem that a juvenile who
gets a youth-discounted-maximum sentence might be sentenced to the
same number of years as an adult who gets a less-than-maximum
sentence, negating the effect of the youth discount. The problem with
this scheme is that it fails to address the rebuttable presumption of
inculpability - a juvenile that is atypically culpable for his crime
would get the same youth-discount as a juvenile who is inculpable.1
66
B. Statutory Overhaul
One alternative to abandoning the juvenile justice system is
complex: in order to retain the present juvenile justice system, and
still cure it of its shortcomings, extensive statutory overhaul would be
required. The difficulties associated with amending the juvenile
statutes and their successive amendments are likely to be prohibitive.
Furthermore, statutory amendments are often time consuming and
inefficient, not to mention perpetual.' 67  The Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA"), the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act ("VCCLEA"), the Prisoner Litigation
Reform Act ("PLRA"), and the Omnibus Crime Control Act
("OCCA") are just some of the many articles of legislation that are
pressed through Congress to address the notion that the current
" See id.
165 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
166 See Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 178 (exploring the presumptions of
culpability between children and adults).
167 See Feld, supra note 150, at 723 (observing the twenty years of ineffectual
constitutional and legislative reform and the juvenile justice system's ability to "deflect,
ignore, or absorb ameliorative tinkering with minimal institutional change").
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juvenile justice system simply does not work. 168  Each time a
deficiency is observed in the juvenile justice system, a new barrage of
legislation is likely to follow.'
69
C. Multiple Juvenile Courts
Another alternative to abolishing the juvenile courts or trying
to restructure a system that has become unwieldy is to create a new
juvenile court system to coexist simultaneously with the existing
juvenile justice system. 170 For example, this new system could group
offenders by age, and classify them in three tiers: as children,
adolescents, or adults. The express recognition of the time between
childhood and adulthood, adolescence, would allow a more realistic
transition to adulthood - thus avoiding what Professor Ainsworth
calls "the adult/child binary opposition."'
7 1
Like the present juvenile justice system, a three-tiered system
would give a presumption of inculpability to children, but would
presume partial culpability for adolescents, although not the total
culpability presumed of adults. In the tier for children, the
rehabilitative aspect would be paramount because of a presumption of
inculpability. 172  From this tier - should the presumption of
inculpability be rebutted - the juvenile could be waived into the tier
for adolescents. In the tier for adolescents, the emphasis would tend
more toward punishment, because adolescents would be presumed
partially culpable. 173 Only from this second tier could a juvenile be
waived into the adult criminal system; and only by way of a judicial
168 See id.
169 See supra notes 14520-14949 and accompanying text for a discussion of
propsed Juvenile Justice Legislation and the circumstances leading up to such legislation.
170 See Feld, supra note 150, at 725 (realizing that "[c]hildren, especially by
adolescence, are more competent than the law acknowledges").
171 See Ainsworth, supra note 27, at 945 (detailing how such opposition is
taken to mean that "child" is the opposite of "adult", when that is not actually the case).
Professor Ainsworth points out that the system's flaw is its failure to adequately assess
people as they are, and instead forcing them into too narrow categories. See id
172 See supra note 166.
173 See Feld, supra note 150, at 724 (noting that "[y]ouths older than fourteen
are mature enough to be responsible for their behavior, but immature enough as to not
deserve punishment commensurate with adults").
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hearing consonant with the guidelines articulated in the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.174 Finally, in the tier for
adults, as now, the emphasis would tend toward the punitive.
75
In such a system, the existing classifications of juveniles
would be incorporated to ensure that each tier was populated
according to whether the child or adolescent was a non-offender,
status offender, or offender instead of simply by age. By
incorporating the classifications presently used, a three-tier system
acknowledges not only the differences between children, adolescents,
and adults but that those differences are the reason that they are
housed separately.1
76
Furthermore, in the three-tiered system juveniles could not be
indiscriminately transferred between tiers. Each transfer would have a
number of procedural safeguards, including the requirement of an
individualized hearing that would govern the removal from one tier to
the next. Furthermore, a transfer could only be made to the next
successive tier. This sequential transfer mechanism would put the
sole transfer power in the hands of the judiciary in accordance with
Kent, and ensures procedural due process by preventing legislators
and prosecutors from removing the juvenile to adult criminal court
based on the crime.
Such a system would necessarily require that the individual
tiers would be specially focused on a finite set of criteria, thereby
ensuring greater facility with the problems that each different tier
would encounter.' 77 Specialization has been the trend in a number of
markets, and it has been suggested that the juvenile justice system
could also benefit from a more specialized approach to the needs of
juveniles. 178 By addressing the needs of the juveniles in the juvenile
174 See supra note 136.
175 See supra note 166.
176 See Fagan, supra note 39 (illustrating that "compared to adolescents
placed in juvenile corrections programs, adolescents sentenced and incarcerated as adults
are much more likely to be physically and sexually assaulted. Research has consistently
shown that such victimization as children and adolescents often lead to higher rates of
crime").
177 See Soler, supra note 21, at 31 (suggesting the creation of a model court
"true to the original spirit and intent of the juvenile court").
178 See id.
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justice system with greater attention to the needs of an individual
group, a multiple-tier juvenile system would more effectively deal
with the realities of what is now largely a punitive process
masquerading as rehabilitation. 79
CONCLUSION
The juvenile justice system has changed considerably over the
past hundred years, from an instrument of rehabilitation designed to
protect children from society, to an instrument of punishment
designed to protect society from children. The arguments of those
who would do away with the juvenile justice system are indeed
compelling. Conservatives are correct in maintaining that many
juveniles go unpunished for those acts that they have committed.
Liberals are correct in their assertion that many juveniles are left
without the constitutional protections that the criminal system would
offer. However, its seems that the decision whether or not to retain a
separate system for juveniles is a choice between the lesser of two
evils. No longer is the question "Which approach is better?" The
appropriate question has become "Which approach is least terrible?"
Abolishing the juvenile justice system has the benefits of a
simplified system where each individual, whether an adult or a
juvenile, would be treated similarly. The laws applicable to one
would be applicable to the other. The age of the offender would duly
be taken into account and the offender's culpability reduced in
proportion with age. This abolitionist approach has a number of
drawbacks, the most important of which is its failure to recognize that
juveniles are not yet adults. While it is well understood that
adolescents are no longer children, it is hard to maintain the position
that they are as accountable as adults. The proliferation of juvenile
justice system laws suggests that modem society perceives juveniles
as fully informed and fully accountable; modem society's perception,
however, may be factually wrong. How can adolescents be
completely liable for those ethical lessons that are not yet learned?
179 See Dale, supra note 125, at 678 (labeling the juvenile justice system as
"theoretically rehabilitative in nature, but in fact is terribly punitive").
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Presuming adolescents to be as completely culpable as adults
supposes that people learn little or no ethical lessons after the age of
twelve; or that all the important lessons should be learned by twelve,
and that everything else is mere moral fastidiousness.
However, maintaining a juvenile justice system entirely
separate from the criminal process, is equally problematic. It
presumes that adolescents haven't learned any lessons since they were
children. It suggests that we can expect no more of juveniles than we
can of children. As the juvenile court abolitionists fail to grasp an
important point, that adolescents are simply not adults, the juvenile
court preservationists fail to grasp an equally important point:
adolescents are no longer children. In this respect the juvenile court
preservationists fail to address the fact that many people believe that
the juvenile justice system treats criminals like kids, instead of kids
like criminals: confronted with headlines from Jonesboro and
Columbine, we are more acutely aware than were our great-
grandparents that adolescents are most definitely not children.
The changing view of society may indeed be that we perceive
adolescents as being morally culpable for their crimes, and wrong or
not, it will always influence the legislature. The truth is that a
hundred years of experimentation with juvenile justice cannot
continue on the same principles that it began on. Society needs a new
experiment, one that is neither our present juvenile justice system, nor
the older system that predates it. Society needs a system that makes
an express recognition of the intangible but very definite difference
between adults and adolescents, and between adolescents and
children. Such a system would be better tailored to the unique
contours of each group, rather than the general outline of them all.
The creation of a new juvenile justice system, with a three-
tiered approach to juveniles and adults appears to be an ideal solution
to the problem. It will not suffer from the myopia that children,
adults, and adolescents are identical - nor will it assume that
everyone who is not an adult is necessarily a child. It will be created
specially to address modern values, rather than resorting back to either
one of two failed methodologies.
The present juvenile justice system is not done; it is merely in
a cocoon from which something new shall emerge. It will need to
have more well-defined procedures both for intake and waiver into the
20001 697
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
adult criminal system. It will need to more adequately address in
what circumstances it is predominantly punitive and in what
circumstances it is predominantly rehabilitative. It will need to take a
more realistic view of what it means to be and adult, or an adolescent,
or a child.
The defects which cripple the juvenile justice system remain
- we are aware that juveniles are not children; that they are in some
way responsible for their actions. However, the theories that sparked
the creation of the juvenile justice system also remain - we are still
aware that juveniles are not adults, that they deserve and require more
rehabilitative treatment. Combining both into a new, three-tiered
juvenile justice system would at last rid us of the worst of both
worlds.
Claude Noriega
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